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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN
DOMESTIC COURT DECISIONS
Gordon A. Christenson*
My paper examines domestic court choices among operational rules as
guides to decision in human rights litigation, with emphasis on U.S. federal
courts, when customary international human rights law is invoked as the
basis for jurisdiction, causes of action or remedies.
United States courts deeply resist "incorporating" the developing
customary international human rights law, even when there is a statutory
basis.' There is little evidence that courts in the United States are influ-
enced much by such new customary law by itself, without explicit approval
by the political branches,2 despite a powerfully-supported litigation strategy
of human rights groups beginning in the late 1970s and a strong tradition of
incorporating customary international law as part of United States law.'
Traditional customary international law, however, continues to be accepted
without express incorporation unless directed otherwise by the political
branches.
While I enthusiastically agree with the renewal of importance of the
international legal process movement, especially as articulated in Harold
Koh's thesis about infusing public values in transnational litigation,4 I view
the trends in international human rights litigation in the United States less
optimistically. There is a clear preference in domestic adjudication for
presuming that traditional customary international law (whether considered
horizontal or vertical, jurisdictional or decisional, public or private) is part
* University Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
See Paul L. Hoffman & Nadine Strossen, Enforcing International Human Rights Law
in the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY (Louis
Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994).
2 See Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in United
States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 27, 28 (1992).
' See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555, 1564 (1984); Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and
Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59 (1990); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmts. a & c (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
" Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L. J. 2347 (1991).
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of U.S. law, but against presuming that customary international human rights
law is part of U.S. law without enactment.5 The modest insight offered here
in my essay suggests using a post-realist choice of law analysis in the
transnational legal process for human rights litigation in all operational
decisions (procedural and substantive) in case-by-case adjudication before
U.S. courts in which customary international human rights law is invoked
alongside forum law and foreign law. The judge then cannot duck the
substantive public law values involved by resisting allegiance to a universal
cosmopolitan public order. The interests in choice of law decisions would
include comity or mutual respect in international cooperation in administer-
ing the overlapping consensus about those human rights values most
universally accepted by the national systems of the community of nations.
What legal policy should a domestic court judge consider when emerging
world-wide demands for universal respect for human rights have crystallized
into customary international law traditionally considered part of U.S. law?
In what respect should domestic courts act as autonomous agents of the
emerging international legal order by internalizing these new expectations
from the international community of states as a whole, thus helping to
reshape the traditional internal political relationship of citizen to state?
Holding officials of a state accountable to the larger community of states for
gross abuses of human rights law in relation to the state's own citizens is a
major claim to international competence by domestic courts which is likely
to place them at odds with national political authority.6 Human rights touch
- Professor Koh equates transnational human rights litigation in U.S. courts with
transnational commercial litigation. Id. at 2379 n.167. I see a difference in the underlying
substantive preferences courts have adopted in using customary international law as a baseline
for decisions or presumptions in economic or inter-state sovereignty questions in contrast to
those in human rights between individuals and their governments. See infra, Section I(B).
6 The proper function of domestic courts in the international legal order is a familiar
question in the 20th century. See RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC CoURTS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 75 (1964) (deference to foreign law is proper when
diversity is legitimate-as in economic or social laws; when diversity of values of two
national societies is illegitimate-as in allowing abuse of genuinely universal human
rights--domestic courts properly fulfill their role by refusing to further the policy of foreign
or domestic law and by giving maximum effect to universality); Richard B. Lillich, The
Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 33
(1970) (preferring an activist role of domestic courts both in economic and in human rights
questions by refusing deference either to foreign law or the domestic executive and by
applying international law directly in litigation).
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the "very foundations of a regime, on its sources and exercises of power, on
its links to its citizens or subjects," making it a "dangerous issue."7
I. STRATEGmS, TRENDS AND NEW ALTERNATIVES
Scholars, governments and courts traditionally have used two doctrines to
deal strategically with the tension between international and municipal law.
These doctrines are the incorporation of international law into municipal law
(monism) and the transformation of one system of rules into that of a
different, incommensurable other system (dualism).'
A. Strategies
Commonly-accepted wisdom for incorporating international human rights
law into United States municipal law is uniformly described in three ways:
by direct incorporation through self-executing treaties or by statute; by direct
incorporation of customary international human rights law as part of U.S. or
common law; and by indirect incorporation or "infusion" of human rights
7 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 1982-V R.C.A.D.I. 329
(quoting Stanley Hoffman).
a Incorporation is the dominant doctrine in common law countries, developed first as a
monist theme to unify international and municipal law. This doctrine was opposed by the
dualist Continental theorists because the "common law doctrine shows the dualist theory to
be inconsistent with existing law." 1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 221 (E.
Lauterpacht ed. 1970). See FERRARI-BRAvO, International Law and Municipal Law: The
Complementarity of Legal Systems, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 715 (R. Macdonald & D.
Johnston eds., 1983); Henkin, supra note 3; Edwin Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the
Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (1932). But see the classic post-realist
exposition of this problem in Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon
National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S. DAK. L. REV. 215 (1959) (dualist-monist
controversy is but a formalistic quibble over some mystical "incorporation" or "transforma-
tion" of rules and hierarchies of rules, inadequate for understanding actual social and power
processes involving the interpenetration of complex patterns of authority and control that
affect shared values across all boundaries). See Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age
of International Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185 (1993) (arguing dualism from
international legal process to encourage Madisonian pluralistic bargains to reduce international
rent-seeking in a representative democracy).
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law through interpretation of existing domestic law.9 With poor success in
ratification of human rights treaties without non-self-executing or other
reservations, and with limited success with statutes recognizing causes of
action grounded in international human rights law, recent litigating strategy
has focused upon expanding the existing statutory base by interpretation of
the Alien Tort Statute, 10 the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991," the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 2 the Federal Tort Claims Act 3 and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 to cover remedies for abuses of internationally protected
human rights.
14
A second strategy has been to use customary international human rights
law for causes of action through U.S. or common law without a statutory
base. 5 This approach has taken several forms. One advances the argument
from incorporation as part of U.S. or common law, absent statutes or
constitutional provisions in conflict, to create an actionable international tort
akin to a Bivens-type constitutional tort. 6 A second has been more
adventuresome, arguing that some norms of customary international law are
jus cogens, the highest status or quality (peremptory norms of the highest
9 Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54
U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 393-415 (1985); Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human
Rights Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 543 (1989). See the recent references in Hoffman & Strossen, supra note
1; Connie de la Vega, Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 15 WHrmrER L. REv.
471, 474 (1994) (recommended litigation strategy in equal protection claims).
1o 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (the
leading case to open this statute to claims of aliens for violations of customary international
human rights law by foreign officials).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1350(a)(2) (1994).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994).
13 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1994).
14 See A.C.L.U. INT'L HuMAN RIGHTS TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LIBERTMS
REPORT (1994) for a series of reports on strategies involving these statutes as well as
customary international human rights law and treaties. See also Paust, supra note 9
(comprehensive survey of use of international law to interpret statutes and constitutional
provisions, claiming steadily increasing interpretive reliance on customary international law).
15 Paust, supra note 9.
'6 Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1428 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (rejecting Bivens-type
cause of action under customary international law for crimes against humanity in Croatia
during World War H in absence of affirmative legislation, "the critical right of the sovereign
to determine whether and how international rights should be enforced in that municipality").
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order and greatest acceptance by the community of states as a whole).17
With this status, they are so powerful that, according to some commentators,
they overcome defenses based upon sovereign or head of state immunities
and may even limit constitutional powers internally." Jus cogens was
invoked (but found not established) as basis for American citizens' civil suit
against their own government to recover for injuries growing from U.S.
responsibility for its breach of important peremptory norms forbidding the
use of coercion in Nicaragua. 9 While some language as obiter dictum in
several decisions of courts of appeal states that U.S. courts have recognized
the concept of jus cogens as part of U.S. law, not a single case has granted
a remedy on that basis alone without being overturned.' This kind of
17 RESTATEMENT § 102 cmt. k (1987). See Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens:
Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585 (1988),
casting a skeptical but not negative view of the concept:
[T]he use of collective coercion against the human person under
assumptions of state sovereignty poses cosmopolitan questions. What
justification must officials and elites provide without the immunity of
official orders? Jus cogens norms increase the need for justification for
otherwise legitimate, collective coercion to be made directly to the larger
international society whose demands and expectations may not be
reflected adequately by governments.
Id. at 647.
'8 Adam C. Belsky et al., Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to
Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 365
(1989); David F. Klein, A Theory for the Application of the Customary International Law of
Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332 (1988); Scott A. Richman,
Comment, Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina: Can the FSIA Grant Immunity for
Violations of Jus Cogens Norms?, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 967 (1993).
'9 Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
2o In Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), overturning Judge Sporkin's
reliance below on jus cogens, Judge Ginsburg's answer by footnote to Judge Wald's dissent
(strongly recommending the incorporation ofjus cogens norms as customary international law
as a basis for both in personam and subject matter jurisdiction) seems to summarize the
dominant view in the federal courts:
While it is true that "international law is a part of our law," Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. at 700, 20 S. Ct. at 299, it is also our law that a federal
court is not competent to hear a claim arising under international law
absent a statute granting such jurisdiction. Judge Wald finds that grant
through a creative, not to say strained, reading of the FSIA against the
background of international law itself.
We think that something more nearly express is wanted before we
impute to the Congress an intention that the federal courts assume
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advocacy is highly risky, for the effective results of the overwhelming
rejection of particular cases has been to raise to an almost impossible
threshold the human rights victims' task of demonstrating the existence of
other norms of customary international human rights law when a statutory
basis does exist.
In fact, several United States courts of appeals now seem to have adopted
the exceedingly onerous burden of proving the existence of a norm of jus
cogens quality as the threshold to limit tort claims for violations of the law
of nations under the Alien Tort Statute.2 The burden upon human rights
victims is now to establish that the tortious breach of the law of nations is
"of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory"22 and the statute may
apply only to "shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized
principles of law."'  The Alien Tort Statute, however, does not say that.
Its text refers only to tortious breach of the law of nations (or a treaty), a
norm shown by reference to traditional sources of international law whether
custom, treaty or general principles.
jurisdiction over the countless human rights cases that might well be
brought by the victims of all the ruthless military juntas, presidents-for-
life, and murderous dictators of the world, from Idi Amin to Mao Zedong.
Such an expansive reading... would likely place an enormous strain not
only upon our courts but, more to the immediate point, upon our
country's diplomatic relations with any number of foreign nations. In
many if not most cases the outlaw regime would no longer even be in
power and our Government could have normal relations with the
government of the day-unless disrupted by our courts, that is.
Id. at 1174 n.l.
21 When the Ninth Circuit clearly joined the Second Circuit in concluding that the Alien
Tort Statute creates a cause of action for violations of "specific, universal and obligatory
international human rights standards" conferring fundamental rights upon all people in relation
to their own governments, it linked its justification to jus cogens. In re Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Marcos]. It
included prohibitions against torture, summary execution and causing disappearances. But
it linked this holding with its own dictum in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1992) that under international law "official torture violates jus cogens" and
satisfies "the specific, universal and obligatory standard. ... [The right to be free from
official torture is fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest stature under
international law, a norm of jus cogens." Id at 717.
2 Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1475 (citing to jus cogens as a reason torture violates customary
international law).
23 Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983).
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It is clear that some way to limit the scope of expansion of the Alien Tort
Statute would be found. Soon after the Filartiga decision was handed down,
Professor Bilder made the point in a symposium. He expressed "some
question whether United States courts will prove very receptive to the idea
that they should furnish a forum for suits by foreigners to vindicate alleged
violations of human rights abroad, or indeed whether this is an effective way
of promoting human rights in other countries."'  More biting is the
explanation that it is the new customary norm directly affecting a nation's
relations with its own citizens that is meeting resistance. 2 The litigation
strategies for non-statutory claims, moreover, have not been pursued with
even-handed skill or consistency by all human rights groups.
A major shift in strategy is underway. Action is moving toward educating
the public, judges and officials; toward pursuing legislation to recognize
additional causes of action; toward pressing for ratification of treaties without
non-self-executing reservations; and toward invoking non-self-executing
treaties themselves as evidence for interpreting the Bill of Rights and Civil
War Amendments with heightened scrutiny to avoid conflict with treaty
obligations.2
These strategies simultaneously require shifts in litigation strategy,
informed by the international legal process school of thought. Such litigation
would be helped by using choice of law principles in all phases of interna-
tional human rights cases where domestic courts intuitively make decisions
on the basis of fairness, interests of victims and concerns of the international
system and governments. This use of private international law for public
purposes would ground the role of United States courts in a global
community of national societies requiring mutual respect and a normative
perspective broader than identifying universalism with the subjective views
24 Richard B. Bilder, Integrating International Human Rights into Domestic Law-U.S.
Experience, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 6-7 (1981).
2 See Schachter, supra note 7. Also, if new customary international human rights law
is federal law, would it not preempt state law under the supremacy clause, a constitutional
effect that would increase the power of federal judges acting under the authority of The
Paquete Habana? Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of
International Law, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 255.
26 But see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322-29 (1988) (international agreements cannot
be used to assert a compelling government interest to justify a ban on protests outside
embassies demeaning or insulting the foreign government, such ban being unconstitutional
under the First Amendment).
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either of hegemonic powers or of commentators. It would not abandon
universal respect for human rights as part of customary international law, but
would use an overlapping consensus among nations without asking judges
to shift allegiance from a national polity to a transcendent hierarchical
authority of universality, an unnecessary choice that does not appear to be
working.
B. Trends in Recent Decisions
Trends in recent United States court decisions reveal contradictory uses of
customary international law, a contemporary update on antimonies of
international law drawn from legal realism.' Moreover, it is a mistake to
leap to the conclusion that parochial domestic courts do not respect or use
customary international law in formulating rules of jurisdiction or decision
without statutory authority.29  They do all the time.' In questions of
jurisdiction, sovereign or diplomatic privileges and immunities, maritime law
and the law merchant, customary international law tacitly guides many
decisions.31 In claims invoking customary international human rights law
reaching political relationships between individuals and governments, courts
have insisted on an explicit statutory basis.
' See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTR.
Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 107 (1992). These commentators criticize the American concern with
customary international law, reflected in the RESTATEMENT'S list in § 702, as "normative
chauvinism" in assuming that "American values are synonymous with those reflected in
international law." They take note of Martti Koskenniemi's comment that this concern is
more with teaching American lawyers how to plead in American courts than revealing much
about international law. Id. at 94.
"$ Schachter, supra note 7, at 328-33 (one antimony is that between sovereign autonomy
within states system and universal international human rights standards).
'9 See Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, for a description.
3 Compare Judge Ginsburg's extreme positivist dualism in recognizing classic sovereign
immunity, but refusing to use newer international law to broaden federal court jurisdiction
over foreign sovereigns under the FSIA, supra note 20, with Senior Judge Weinstein's use of
customary international law to provide visiting head of state immunity not explicitly covered
by the FSIA, in LaFontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). See also
Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV.
665 (1986) (critical of incorporating customary international law in U.S. law).
3' Described in Koh, supra note 4, at 2351 et seq.
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How does one understand these apparent contradictions in light of recent
calls for the interpenetration of domestic and international legal decision-
making in redefining "sovereignty"?32 Limiting my observation mainly to
United States courts, I believe that far from "entering a new era,"33 the
Supreme Court and perhaps the political branches, too, are still in the
Lochner era in how they use customary international law. By analogy to the
Supreme Court's use of the common law in constitutional interpretation at
the turn of the century,' 4 courts today use customary international law in
much the same way.3" Just as the Lochner era courts used common law
property and freedom of contract concepts as the constitutional baseline
protecting individual and corporate "sovereignty" or "autonomy" as "natural"
rights protected from state interference, so today federal courts tend to use
the older customary international law to maintain state sovereignty and
economic liberties of autonomous enterprise units operating within the
international system of order and exchange. And just as the Supreme Court
at the turn of the century resisted broad judicial or Congressional enforce-
ment of the human rights provisions of the Civil War amendments directly
within the States,' so today federal courts resist incorporating the newer
customary international human rights law as United States law under the
Supremacy Clause to limit state action. The interpenetration of international
and domestic law does affect internal relationships between governments and
persons within the domestic jurisdiction. But courts tend to intervene in this
relationship to protect private economic arrangements across borders under
customary international law more than to protect citizens from their own
national or state governments' abuse of those human rights outlined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Not all customary international law
32 See Louis Henkin, A Post-Col War Human Rights Agenda, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 149
(1994).
33 Koh, supra note 4, at 2402.
34 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (protecting common law economic
liberties of contract and property from redistributive social legislation).
35 See CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 3-7, 61-67 (1993) (challenging the
Lochner era view of constitutional limitations preventing government interventions that disturb
the baseline neutrality of existing economic distributions made "naturally" through common
law contract and property concepts).
I The most notorious decision in this era is Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(federal courts must uphold separate but equal race-based discrimination in State laws as not
violating the Constitution). See In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (limiting
Congressional power to intervene in civil rights matters of the States).
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has the same effect in domestic courts. This preliminary insight may be
observed through U.S. court decisions involving any government's interna-
tional obligations with respect to its own citizens or others within the state's
own jurisdiction.37
In a series of recent cases, the United States Supreme Court and various
courts of appeals have told lower federal courts in effect to limit drastically
their use of the judicial power to apply general or customary international
law as the authoritative rule of decision in certain human rights cases.
Specifically, federal courts do not incorporate customary international law of
human rights without clear congressional authority. They simply do not give
any encouragement to judicial application of the newer customary interna-
tional human rights law.3" It has become a general Supreme Court canon
that a remedy under federal common law will not be implied from any
common law principle if a federal statute does not clearly provide a cause
of action.39  Is it any more astonishing that the courts would resist
incorporating the newer customary international law of human rights as self-
executing U.S. or common law, without the aid of clearly applicable statutes?
Whatever one thinks about the extent to which the traditional law of nations
is part of U.S. law, it runs deeply against the grain of contemporary Supreme
Court opinion for federal judges to recognize or develop federal law
(whether common or "laws of the United States") to imply private causes of
action competing with state remedies without clear statutory authority. 4'
3 See Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual
Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS LJ.
805, 873 (1990).
' Even under legislative authority provided by statutes such as the Alien Tort Statute, the
Torture Victim Protection Act or 28 U.S.C. § 1331, United States courts almost never exercise
federal jurisdiction by implying private causes of action arising under this new customary
international human rights law between non-state private parties. See Doe v. Karadzic, 866
F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (dismissing action against the de facto head of Bosnian-Serb
forces for condoning brutal rapes and human rights violations in former Yugoslavia); Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,
770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
" For example, see O'Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Depositor's Ins. Corp., 114 S. Ct. 2048
(1994), in which the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a claim of federal common law in an
agency suit against a law firm for legal malpractice in a failed savings and loan case even
when acting to recover funds under federal law.
' Moving away from Professor Field's thesis that the power to create federal common
law is and should be broader and more discretionary with federal judges than is generally
assumed. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV.
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Even when a statute provides federal jurisdiction to decide a tort in violation
of the law of nations, the courts do not open that jurisdictional window very
wide in human rights cases.
Those circuit courts of appeals which have allowed subject matter
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute for breaches of customary
international law limit such jurisdiction to "violations of specific, universal
and obligatory international human rights standards which 'confer ...
fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own governments.' "'
The Second Circuit limited the reach of the Alien Tort Statute even further
to "shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized principles of
law" in an appeal after Filartiga, which the court found frivolous and
applied sanctions.4 '  Under the statute, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits
recognize customary international human rights law prohibitions on torture,
summary executions or murder, causing disappearances, prolonged arbitrary
detention, and perhaps inhuman and degrading treatment, in addition to
prohibitions on genocide and slavery.43  A violation of free speech,
however, "does not rise to the level of such universally recognized rights and
so does not constitute a 'law of nations.' " Government confiscation of
property of a citizen and resident is "not a violation of the law of nations,
which governs civilized states in their dealings with each other" and thus
does not state a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute.45
L. REv. 883 (1986).41Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1475 (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885-87 and allowing prohibitions
against summary execution and disappearances in addition to official torture under the Alien
Tort Statute).
42 Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1983). The Court of Appeals upheld dismissal
of an action under the Alien Tort Statute by a Colombian national for deprivation of property
for alleged failure to pay promptly the proceeds of a winning lottery prize. In a warning
against "unreasonable and vexatious... proceedings by appellant's attorney" the court found
the appeal frivolous and awarded double costs against appellant and her attorney. Id. at 692.43 Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1475; De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1397
(5th Cir. 1985).
" Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986). Oscar Schachter's Hague
lectures established the theoretical basis for the distinction that relative intensities are more
powerfully recognized for slavery, genocide, torture or apartheid than for censorship or
property takings. Schachter, supra note 7, at 336-38.
45 Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1976); Jafari v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1992); De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1397 ("the taking by a state
of its national's property does not contravene the international law of minimum human
rights"); but cf Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 711-12 (proceeding at trial on the grounds
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While most federal courts resist new federal common law, they less
reluctantly incorporate and apply long-standing customary international law
without statute.' They incorporate into the interpretation of statutes or
treaties general principles of international law derived from territorial
sovereignty among nation-States. Judge Weinstein, for instance, recently
invoked common law immunity for visiting heads of state as background to
interpret the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in a suit brought against
President Aristide of Haiti under the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991.' Courts cite international law to limit the effect of broad statutes to
United States territory unless Congress specifies clearly otherwise.s
In business and commercial dealings, the presumption shifts as well. The
policy of the federal courts is to enforce party choice of law and forum in
arbitration clauses placed in international contracts for disputes even under
a federal statute, as if reading into the federal arbitration statute a right of
freedom of contract across national boundaries, unless the substantive statute
creates an exclusive federal remedy which explicitly limits the parties' choice
to opt out of federal jurisdiction.49 Moreover, in interpreting self-executing
commercial treaties in the face of later statutes such as the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, federal courts strain to avoid conflicts with treaty preferences and
immunities for foreign investors and managers who might be charged with
discriminatory practices under the statute. 50
Possibly to preserve market economies across national boundaries, the
Supreme Court recently refused to apply an asserted rule of customary
international law of reasonableness limiting the extraterritorial reach of the
that expropriation without compensation of a U.S. citizen's property in Argentina by the
Argentine government violates international law).
' The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), provided a remedy under ancient custom
and usage in prize law for wrongful seizure of a private vessel on the high seas during time
of war, thus incorporating customary international law to determine a claim of title or
compensation, absent political directives otherwise.
' LaFontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 134-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
48 E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989).
4 See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
-o Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991) (Civil Rights Act of 1964
construed to avoid conflict by deferring to treaty and exempting Japanese managers and
technical personnel, thereby avoiding abrogation of treaty); Starrett v. Iberia Airlines of Spain,
756 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (treaty with Spain does not cover discriminatory
replacement of U.S. national with national not a citizen of Spain).
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Sherman Antitrust Act over foreign reinsurers not exempt under the domestic
exception for setting insurance rates.5" Federal courts use the older
customary international law of state-to-state relations to determine title to
property or to protect the negotiability of title in international commerce in
appropriate cases.52 Interpenetration of public international law and
domestic law in business and commercial transactions is presumptively
acceptable. 3 Interpenetration in international human rights law requires
explicit legislative enactment.4
Many international lawyers criticize the judges for failure to appreciate
arguments that customary international law, like federal common law, is
binding in appropriate cases as the authoritative rule of decision. Advocates
have lost ground trying to use that argument when general or customary
international human rights law places duties on states in relation to their own
citizens. U.S. courts have resisted applying that law as the sole rule of
decision, even when authorized.55 American jurists are not inclined to use
international law to protect individuals in domestic litigation, as Justice
Blackmun eloquently pointed out in his dinner address to the American
"' Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993). Justice Scalia's partial
dissent strongly disagreed with Justice Souter's majority opinion and analysis of the
application of international comity. The dissent said "the practice of using international law
to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly established in our jurisprudence." la
at 2920. Scalia repeatedly cited the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES, especially in relying on Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). Justice Souter barely mentioned that case and
did not rely upon its reasoning. He would have merely limited jurisdiction to adjudicate but
only after first considering the federal jurisdiction and then only when a foreign defendant
could not comply both with foreign law and U.S. law. The Scalia dissent would have
considered limitations from international law in the initial question of jurisdiction to prescribe.
52 See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (claim of title to or compensation for taking
of a vessel seized on the high seas during war in violation of the laws of war); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (presumptive validity of act of foreign
state taking property within its own territory thereby assuring negotiability of title and bill of
lading in international commerce).
s" Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 37, 61-64
(1993).
m Cf. FALK, supra note 6. Perhaps Falk's thesis of judicial deference in economic
regulation where international law lacks consensus but judicial activism to protect human
rights where a consensus is universal needs revision. Would it not be more accurate to say
that trends support a consensus favoring contract and property concepts but that human rights
concepts, except for a few, are now among the most divisive and non-universally recognized?
s5 See Judge Nickerson's hybrid analysis, infra note 92 and accompanying text.
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Society of International Law.56
The Supreme Court has reinforced this inclination in recent cases. It
declined to use general or customary international law as an aid in interpret-
ing the meaning of an extradition treaty in order to protect the rights of an
accused by limiting the Executive's exercise of enforcement jurisdiction
abroad.5 ' The Supreme Court rejected the use of customary international
law to interpret a statute to protect Haitian refugees on the high seas, in
effect upholding the President's power on the high seas to turn their boats
back.58 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit declined to recognize for
the purpose of jurisdiction that international terrorism and torture by non-
state actors injuring U.S. citizens abroad violates customary international
human rights law.59 Nor can we be sure that the Supreme Court would
affirm the Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuits' interpretations of the Alien Tort
Statute to allow the cause of action to be stated by an independent rule of
customary international law, beyond its use as a jurisdictional base under the
statute.'
In contrast, the Supreme Court has used general international law to
buttress a canon of statutory construction that presumes statutes are territorial
and cannot be extended to protect individuals abroad from discrimination by
U.S. companies under the Civil Rights Act unless Congress declares its will
explicitly.61 The Court has used general international law principles as
background structure for interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
to allow jurisdictional immunity for sovereign acts: 1) damaging a neutral
ship and cargo on the high seas during war;62 and 2) allegedly torturing a
' "Modern jurists... are notably lacking in the diplomatic experience of early Justices
such as John Jay and John Marshall, who were familiar with the law of nations and felt
comfortable navigating by it. Today's jurists, furthermore, are relatively unfamiliar with
interpreting instruments of international law .... Although the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court do not offer much hope for the immediate future, I look forward to the day
when the Supreme Court, too, will inform its opinions almost all the time with a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind." Justice Blaclanun Addresses ASIL Annual Dinner, ASIL
NEWSLETTER (Am. Soc'y Int'l L.), March 1994, at 6-7.
s United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (1994).
9 Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775-76 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring).
' Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.
1994); De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 1985).
61 E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
62 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
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United States citizen in its own territory despite an employment relationship,
a commercial activity negotiated in the United States.63
Lower courts which try to import or imaginatively develop the norms of
general or customary international law of human rights as rules of decision
in cases before them risk reversal on appeal or affirmance on other
grounds.' There is also a direct parallel here to the Reconstruction era
when the Supreme Court cut back decisions and remedies of lower courts in
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment and civil rights laws, thereby curtailing
national intervention to protect citizens from wrongs by the states, except
when the police power affected property and contract--economic liber-
ties-in the Lochner era.6
In two law review articles at the beginning of the 1980s, I advanced two
theses for a decisional process to balance obligations of customary interna-
tional law recognized by the community of states with domestic law in
judicial proceedings litigating human rights claims. One applied the process
to civil liability. The other proposed its use in a constitutional process to
determine limitations on governmental power.
The first thesis distinguishes the use of customary international law for
exercising federal jurisdiction in a civil action from its permissible use as a
rule of decision where choice of law principles would normally apply in U.S.
courts to determine the law governing a transitory tort committed abroad.6
I argued that customary international human rights law should be used as the
standard for choice of law policy decisions. 7 In my opinion Judge
63 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
"See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on
other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th
Cir. 1986); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992). For
citations to favorable human rights decisions by lower courts, see Strossen, supra note 37, at
835-36 nn.140-42.
' For discussion of the favorable civil rights rulings by lower federal courts during the
first part of Reconstruction and the subsequent reversal by the Supreme Court during the
second part, see ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLrTCS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CwIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985).
6The Supreme Court had not yet decided Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461
U.S. 480 (1983) (allowing federal jurisdiction between a foreign plaintiff and a foreign state
instrumentality under FSIA even though there was no diversity jurisdiction).
0 Gordon A. Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional
Interpretation, 4 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 39, 41-49 (1981) (considering universal human rights
norms in choice of law analysis in light of conflicts of law literature and theory):
In choice of law questions involving foreign law, fundamental human
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Nickerson used a similar approach in the Filartiga case remand.6
The second thesis proposes a way to interpret constitutional limitations on
delegated or reserved powers, such as provided in the due process and equal
protection clauses, by an exacting examination of government action to avoid
breaching international legal obligations-whether in non-self-executing
treaties or under customary international law-to protect fundamental human
rights without offending principles of representative democracy.' The
recommended process of a more searching judicial review, when state action
burdens a constitutional right that overlaps an international human rights
obligation, avoids the problem of incorporating fundamental human rights
directly as extra-constitutional limitations on the powers of the President or
Congress or on the reserved powers of the states. Instead, the courts should
respect those international legal obligations created or observed by the
political branches by using them as important instruments of interpretation
of the limitations of the due process and equal protections clauses in
appropriate cases. This process would take the international rule of law
seriously in interpreting these limitations. "This use should avoid conflict
between democratic theory and the universal standards of the international
community." 70
The Supreme Court has never considered this process approach, nor, to my
knowledge, have any of the federal courts of appeals. Apart from litigation
under the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act, the trend
has in fact moved the other way, to subordinate international norms in
human rights controversies to municipal constitutional interpretation.7'
rights norms should be used as the standard for determining whether to
use the law of the other country, thereby giving it comity and respect, or
when the lex delicti derogates too greatly from the standards of the forum,
to create a new norm based on the international human rights standard.
Id. at 55.
"See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
9Christenson, supra note 67, at 55. See also Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human
Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 19-
20 (1983).
70 Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection
Analysis, supra note 69, at 36.
7' This trend comes despite more recent urgings of scholars. See Richard B. Lillich, The
United States Constitution and International Human Rights Law, 3 HARV. H. RTS. J. 53
(1990).
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Judicial recognition and balancing of important international obligations,
according to critics, might undercut core constitutional freedoms.72
II. WHY HAVE STRATEGIES FAILED?
Why do federal courts resist implying a cause of action from customary
international human rights law as part of United States law, given the
historical status of customary international law as part of that law and its use
in traditional state-to-state and economic transactions?73  Professor Bril-
mayer's optimistic appraisal suggests that courts should defer to political
authority in traditional horizontal state-to-state relationships, but appropriate-
ly use international law to adjudicate claims from vertical relationships
between individuals and governments, as in human rights abuses.74 This
explanation, however, does not inquire further into the substantive and policy
differences in decisions in vertical relationships between those for human
rights abuses and those protecting economic freedoms observed above. 75
Consider at least four further explanations.
First is the fear that the hard-won protections already within the Bill of
Rights, widely viewed as more protective of liberties than under international
human rights law, might be diluted and weakened by reference to external
standards. 76
n In Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322-29 (1988), the Supreme Court said that
international agreements could not be used to support a compelling government interest
required by the First Amendment to justify a ban on protests outside embassies aimed at
demeaning or insulting the foreign government. Using international obligations to accord
higher standards than may be accorded under domestic law by increasing the burden of
justification on government, however, is not the same as using international agreements to
reduce protection of freedom of expression under the domestic constitution.
"' Paust, supra note 3.
74 Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE
LJ. 2277 (1991). I agree with Professor Koh's criticism of this distinction as normatively
artificial and empirically non-descriptive. See Koh, supra note 4, at 2379-82.
75 See LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS ch. 2 (1989) (for development
of the distinction between vertical and horizontal approaches to international law).
76 In this connection, see the statements in opposition to ratification of the international
human rights treaties, made during hearings in 1979, extracted and reprinted in HENRY J.
STEIER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 626-33 (4th ed. 1994) (e.g., Phyllis
Schlafly, "the treaties imperil or restrict existing rights of Americans by using treaty law...
to upset the balance of power within our unique system of federalism"). While freedom of
expression is the one most clearly on point, there are other examples in which cutting back
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Second, it is widely and correctly thought that international human rights
law is grounded in affirmative duties placed on governments to ensure social
equality and human dignity and not just in negative duties not to deprive
individuals of liberties." Such affirmative international obligations,
basically redistributive in nature, demand an increased role for central
government which should be beyond the judicial prerogative, according to
this central criticism." For courts to incorporate the new underlying
premises of affirmative human rights obligations on government in rules of
decision or equitable relief, it is thought, would allow courts to direct the
democratic institutions of republican government in ways that go well
beyond the normal responses to the counter-majoritarian dilemma.79
Assuming this burden as a judicial function prudentially exceeds judicial
competence and know-how, the argument goes. It would not just upset the
constitutional balance among the states, the presidency, the federal courts and
Congress: a balance which has been worked out at least from the time of the
New Deal, when the political branches wrested power away from the courts.
It is likely to be exercised poorly, without the instruments of government and
political operation to implement and make effective the affirmative
obligations courts are not very good at undertaking through the remedial
powers of equity. To preserve judicial power, courts need to use these
sparingly. And there is no guarantee that affirmative remedial actions will
move in the substantive direction desired by human rights activists.
constitutional protection in criminal procedure of the states under the 14th Amendment has
also had the effect of diluting the formerly stricter federal standard of the original Bill of
Rights.
"See Schachter, supra note 7, at 331-32, 345-51 (critical evaluation and recommendation
regarding affirmative obligations of human rights as redistributive, and the limits of judicial
review). The rhetoric of first, second and third generational rights within the human rights
community encourages wariness by courts. See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE RIGHTS
OF PEOPLES 65-66, 159-66 (1988); Philip Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights:
Progressive Development or Obfiscation of International Human Right Law?, 29 NETH. INT'L
L. REv. 307 (1982); Roland Y. Rich, The Right to Development as an Emerging Human
Right, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 287 (1983).
78 Even Roosevelt's call for a "second bill of rights" and a new social contract for
economic well-being did not mean a judicially-enforced set of affirmative constitutional
entitlements. He did not trust the courts, generally being conservative organs, and wanted
them to stand out of the way of the legislative political agenda.
" For a response to this concern, see Lea Brilmayer, supra note 74, at 2309-11; Bayefsky
& Fitzpatrick. supra note 2, at 82-89.
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There is some merit in these arguments. The judicial restrictions placed
on the 14th amendment curtailed drastically congressional and judicial
enforcement of the values underlying the civil war amendments (except for
property and contract) for over a hundred years. By a denuding interpreta-
tion of the privileges or immunities clause of the 14th Amendment, the
Supreme Court disabled Congress from legislating under enforcement powers
expressly delegated in Section 5 of that Amendment. Only the strained
interpretation of the due process and equal protection clauses in the New
Deal era saved the powers of the national legislature and the federal courts
to protect civil rights. There is no guarantee that the courts will not in fact
create judicial obstacles to the incorporation of international human rights
norms.
Third, an unspoken fear, probably present from the beginning in relation
to slavery, is that officials and elites in the United States might be held
accountable themselves, perhaps in foreign courts, under the new customary
international human rights law for treatment of their own people and
minorities-the same standard we expect of other countries.' Where there
is an affirmative obligation upon government to guarantee positive rights to
food, education, health and well-being, omissions of state might be
actionable if customary international law is an incorporated rule of
decision."' Under this theory of incorporation, officials acting under color
of law could be held accountable in foreign or domestic courts for serious
breaches of international standards.
The fourth concern is that the floodgates will open to foreign plaintiffs'
suits against their governments as well as citizens' suits against officials in
the United States beyond those permitted by statute. 2
' On this point, see the statements of Professors Farer and Sohn, made in the 1979 Senate
Hearings on International Human Rights Treaties, extracted and reprinted in STEINER ET AL.,
supra note 76, at 631 (race relations, superior attitudes and a fear of skeletons in the closet).
si See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989),
holding that there are no affirmative obligations in the constitution actionable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, unless first undertaken by government action and control. For a critical analysis of
this problem in customary international law of state responsibility, see Gordon A. Christenson,
Attributing Acts of Omission to the State, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 312 (1991).
' See Judge Ginsburg's comment in Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
See also Robert Pear, Judges Proposing to Narrow Access to Federal Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 1994, at Al (panel of the Judicial Conference of the United States considering a
policy of limiting access to federal courts in anticipation of "impending crisis" in projected
filings of "nightmarish" proportions in view of extensions of federal jurisdiction in criminal
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Would a more artful shift in strategy with more carefully designed cases
for litigation accomplish better results? I doubt that a strategy of direct or
indirect incorporation would. The important question is whether the courts
should leave the incorporation of the broad premises of international human
rights law affecting the basic relationship of citizens with their governments
to the political organs of each country for detailed implementation. There
is, however, a better strategy for litigation (in addition to the legislative
route), which does not ask domestic courts on their own national authority
to act hierarchically as agents for international society to interpose customary
international human rights law between citizens and governments.
My recommendation revises and extends the use of customary internation-
al human rights law for the operational rules throughout the litigation
process. Instead of relying upon the incorporation theory, it is time to
consider choice of law theory, but used with greater sophistication. Opening
policy choices among rules of decision that will allow a balance among
international and domestic policies and interests to shape outcomes is
familiar to U.S. courts, from their extensive domestic conflict of laws
experience. From the perspectives of U.S., foreign and international
communities, different policies and interests shape operational decisions on
jurisdiction, procedure, causes of action, damages and enforcement in all
aspects of litigation. Imaginative opportunities from conflict of laws theory
also might best advance human rights without undercutting democratic
institutions or imposing forum law when international interests might suggest
better results. By allowing consideration of the law in other countries when
the litigation is closely connected to government interests there, as well as
by considering universal consensus of the community of peoples in all
countries, conflict of law theory accommodates the counter-majoritarian
argument and permits non-democratic hierarchical regimes respect so long
as they do not abridge those human rights universally recognized.83
and civil cases).
' When customary international law is nationalized, the closest analogy for choice of law
analysis is Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (applying interest analysis to choose
foreign law over U.S. law in case involving alien seaman injured on board foreign vessel in
port of third country). That case was suggested by Judge Nickerson as a beginning point in
choice of law and fairness analysis in Filartiga, on remand.
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I. CONFLICT OF LAWS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A strong legal realist tradition in the United States, reflected in interest
and policy analyses of conflict of laws questions, recognizes that jurisdiction
is the central question." All other questions, including the law governing
choice of law, become forum court choice of policies underlying the
available rules, once the court has jurisdiction over persons and subject
matter, absent a clear statute or constitutional requirements such as due
process or full faith and credit.
When universal respect for human rights begins to suggest international
constitutional loyalties for federal judges because the jurisdiction of federal
courts is based not on diversity but on federal questions arising from
customary international law, a potentially revolutionary idea may be
unleashed. The legal realist may answer that all international law is
domestic law because only decisions made by a forum with coercive power
over the parties count as law to guide other decisions. 5 But that answer
is also instrumental and inadequate as Lasswell and McDougal first
understood at the outset of World War II when they proposed a comprehen-
sive post-realist process of decision in service of human dignity." At all
stages of functional realist analysis, questions of substance, not merely of
loyalty to the polity authorizing coercion, have to be faced' 7-including the
" See Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 252-58 (summarizing legal realists' view of
interest analysis). In that tradition, the authors' thesis is that "the different forms of rhetoric
distinguishing judicial jurisdiction decisions from choice of law decisions are, in fact, only
two superficially different formats for describing the answer to a single question .... Choice
of judicial jurisdiction is choice of law because choosing a jurisdiction chooses the legal
regime that will select, interpret and apply the policies that will determine the result in the
particular case." Id. at 255.
" Harold G. Maier, Baseball and Chicken Salad: A Realistic Look at Choice of Law, 44
VAND. L. REV. 827, 838 (1991) (disagreeing with Professor Brilmayer's political rights basis
for applying a foreign rule of law: "There can be no burden and no political right not to be
burdened until some authoritative decisionmaker realistically contemplates applying the rule
to a party in a case, and the only authoritative decisionmaker that can apply it is the forum
court. The court derives that authority solely from its own body politic.").
8 Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE LJ. 203 (1943).
" Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and
Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087 (1956).
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questions of consequences of a forum court decision when the parties are not
completely subject to the forum polity's coercive powers."8
Theoretically, conflict of laws jurisprudence in civil actions for internation-
al human rights violations is compatible with a universal consensus for
respecting fundamental human rights among a reasonable society of peoples
while respecting institutions of domestic law.89 A mutual reciprocal respect
of that political relationship by domestic courts reinforces a court's
allegiance to its own state's political institutions, so long as it is compatible
with the minimum conditions for "a law of peoples" (non-expansionist and
peaceful; law legitimate in the eyes of its own people; and honoring basic
human rights).' Only when an outlaw regime does not honor the basic
human rights in its own formal law would another state's institutions
prudently apply universal human rights law to hold the regime responsible
to victims of its abuse, for according to Rawls, a peoples should be
encouraged to develop free-standing institutions capable of meeting minimum
conditions even in hierarchical, non-liberal societies. 91
This process of analysis can be seen in the remand of Filartiga from the
Second Circuit once the Alien Tort Statute had been interpreted to allow
jurisdiction over an outlaw regime's abuse of its own people because its
officials did not follow that country's own law which formally outlawed
torture and thus complied with basic international human rights prohibiting
official torture. District Court Judge Nickerson stated pointedly that the
"common law of the United States includes... conflict of laws [principles
that] have been concerned with the relevant policies of the interested national
states, and with 'the needs' of the 'international systems.' "' From that
beginning principle of reciprocal respect, he then used interest analysis to
88 For a view of legal realism taking into account international realism and proposing new
directions for choice of laws, see LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOuNDATIoNS AND
FuTURE DIRECIONS 30-41, 107-08 (1991).
" See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNEsTY
LECRES 1993, at 41, 68 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993) ("... basic human
rights express a minimum standard of well-ordered political institutions for all peoples who
belong, as members in good standing, to a just political society of peoples."). See also JOHN
RAWLS, PoLrrcAL LIBERALISM 39, 207-09 (1993) for an exposition of the meaning of
"overlapping consensus" as a way to reach common good among liberal and hierarchical
societies.
go Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 89, at 78-82.
" Id at 73-74.
92 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y 1984).
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shape a rule of decision, citing the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§ 6(2). 3 He considered "interests of Paraguay to the extent they do not
inhibit the appropriate enforcement of the applicable international law or
conflict with the public policy of the United States." Instead of choosing a
single external rule, he constructed a hybrid rule of decision for the particular
case considering foreign law of Paraguay first and then analyzing its
consistency with customary international law and with forum law:
The international law prohibiting torture established the
standard and referred to the national states the task of
enforcing it .... Congress entrusted that task to the federal
courts and gave them power to choose and develop federal
remedies to effectuate the purposes of the international law
incorporated into United States common law .... [A]ny
remedy they fashion must recognize that this case concerns
an act so monstrous as to make its perpetrator an outlaw
around the globe .... [That] the interests of the global
community transcend those of any one state ... does not
mean that traditional choice-of-law principles are irrelevant
.... All these factors make it appropriate to look first to
Paraguayan law in determining the remedy for the violation
of international law .... In concert with the other nations
of the world Paraguay prohibited torture and thereby reaped
the benefits the condemnation brought with it. Paraguayan
citizens may not pretend that no such condemnation ex-
ists.9
4
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT oF LAWS § 6 (1971) (needs of the international
system are to be considered in the factor analysis). "Choice-of-law rules... should seek to
further harmonious relations between states .. " Id. at cmt. d, at 13.
" Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Compare this reasoning to
that of this commentator before the remand was decided:
The role of the domestic court in choice of law matters is to give respect
and deference to the law of the place of injury, as well as to international
law. Respect for the lex delicti is a deference to order as well. When the
law of the forum is premised upon respect for fundamental human rights,
the reconciliation of the choice of law will rest heavily upon the judgment
of whether the law of the foreign state is compatible with both the law of
the forum and international human rights law. If it is not compatible,
only then would the court face the question of whether an independent
private cause of action might emerge through a rule of decision premised
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What has been forgotten is the connection between the public international
law question addressed in Judge Kaufman's theory of jurisdiction and Judge
Nickerson's theory of choice of law to shape rules of operational decision in
reaching a judgment. Many commentators credit the Kaufman opinion with
deciding that customary international human rights law prohibiting official
torture is to determine the outcome of the case as well as jurisdiction under
the Alien Tort Statute. That was plainly not what Judge Kaufman decided
or said.9" And it was not quite what Judge Nickerson decided or said
either. The trial judge considered international human rights law, to be sure,
and it influenced his rule of decision. But his reasoning was rooted in the
conflict of laws reasoning drawn from legal realism, in which customary
international human rights law became relevant not directly through the
jurisdictional statute as such but through forum choice of policy analysis
forming a coherent part of the decision process once the court had jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter.
This distinction opens the entire human rights litigation arena to a richer
use of international law and comity for shaping all the operational rules for
conducting the litigation. International choice of law in customary
international human rights then theoretically becomes an instrument of public
international law through instruction by the legislature." It gives respect
to harmonious relations between states as well as to the minimum conditions
for basic human rights among a "society of peoples." In each phase of
litigation, comity or reciprocal respect among nations is an important policy
to be weighed together with forum law, foreign law and basic human rights
upon the human rights norm outlawing torture.
Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, supra
note 67, at 46-47.
" Judge Kaufman decided only the question of jurisdiction, commenting that the choice
of law inquiry is much broader, primarily concerned with fairness. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d at 889.
" As Dickinson pointed out, the law of nations "became a source, rather than an integral
part, of the national system .... Indeed, in its modem version, the doctrine [of incorporation]
is essentially like the modern Anglo-American doctrine underlying the so-called conflict of
laws or private international law." Edwin D. Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine
of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 260 (1932). For a similar conclusion for federal
jurisdiction and supremacy, see Harold H. Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of
International Law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 294-95
(1932) (international law cannot per se become part of municipal law through federal law
without subject matter jurisdiction and even then "denotes not a separate legal system, but
merely a legal subject-matter.").
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law when shaping rules of operational decision. In international human
rights litigation, questions arise at each stage where private international law
analysis would strengthen global cooperation in international human rights.
First, what law or policy should govern jurisdiction? Second, what
policies should determine which rule the forum court selects to govern the
cause of action? Third, should only forum law govern procedure, including
international choice of law governing limitations of action or certification of
an international class action comprised solely or significantly of human rights
victims in other countries? Fourth, what principles should govern the choice
of remedies, including actual and punitive damages and injunctions? Fifth,
what consideration should be given to principles that govern the enforcement
of human rights judgments rendered by the forum court in the courts of
another state? It is instructive to see precisely how these questions were
addressed in the leading cases in U.S. courts.
After deciding jurisdiction in Filartiga, Judge Kaufman explicitly leaves
the further choice of law policy analysis to the trial judge on remand,
commenting later in an article in the New York Times Magazine that the
broad response to torture is best left to the policy makers and cautioning that
the Alien Tort Statute should not be read as "engaging in messianic moral
imperialism."'
On remand, District Judge Nickerson begins his under-appreciated opinion
by stating that the
Court of Appeals decided only that Section 1350 gave
jurisdiction. We must now face the issue left open ...,
namely, the nature of the 'action' over which the section
affords jurisdiction. Does the 'tort' to which the statute
refers mean a wrong 'in violation of the law of nations' or
merely a wrong actionable under the law of the appropriate
sovereign state? The latter construction would make the
violation of international law pertinent only to afford
jurisdiction. The court would then, in accordance with
traditional conflict of laws principles, apply the substantive
law of Paraguay. If the 'tort' to which the statute refers is
the violation of international law, the court must look to that
Irving Kaufman, A Legal Remedy for International Torture?, N.Y. TIMEs MAGAZINE,
Nov. 9, 1980, § 6, at 44, 52.
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body of law to determine what substantive principles to
apply.9
8
This reasoning was decidedly not "messianic moral imperialism" because
the forum court gave full respect to the law of Paraguay but also used the
customary international law of human rights to prevent the hypocrisy of the
claim by Pena, the Paraguayan citizen-official, that Paraguayan law did not
cover official torture because it had not been applied in the past. The court
then proceeded to apply the law of Paraguay to include moral damages
adding punitive damages under international law and public policy of the
forum court, a somewhat more controversial determination."
While forum procedure controlled the case, it is not so clear that procedure
always should be forum court law. Are limitations of actions never
considered under foreign law? Should class actions involving international
classes always be governed by forum due process concepts of fairness and
representation? Should the conduct of litigation never take into consideration
the fact that enforcement of judgments may entail public international law
aspects as well as those from private international law?
In the Marcos' Estate international human rights litigation, forum
procedure (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) applied to the certification of
an international class of victims in the Philippines, to equitable remedies to
preserve the Estate's assets and to the survival of action; Philippine law was
applied to allow punitive damages."° The interests of the international
community as a whole (as in harmonious relations between two democracies)
were not evaluated except through the perspective of universal standards
against official torture and arbitrary killings. When international law
provides no limitation of action in a claim of torture, genocide and slave
labor, forum law presumably would be used as a limitation, unless an
overriding norm of the international community were selected as part of the
policy of the forum.'
"Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y 1984).
See Richard B. Lillich, Damages for Gross Violations of International Human Rights
Awarded by U.S. Courts, 15 HuM. RTS. Q. 207 (1993) (cataloguing actual and punitive
damage awards in judgments under Alien Tort Statute and questioning choice of law of forum
to govern punitive damages).
'0o Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
101 See Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (dictum) (decided on grounds of
sovereign immunity).
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IV. FUNCTIONAL RULES OF DECISION IN DOMESTIC
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
Customary international human rights law, forum law and relevant foreign
law represent different policies and interests. All should contribute to the best
policy to guide decisions for each aspect of human rights litigation in
domestic courts in the United States. There are five distinct questions for
forum courts to ask when litigation invoking customary international human
rights law comes before them.
Jurisdiction. First, should courts ever invoke customary international
human rights law to determine federal jurisdiction over civil cases or
controversies, with concurrent jurisdiction in state courts, as law of the
United States or federal common law? Without a clearly applicable statute,
as we have seen, recent trends say no. Such law undoubtedly provides a
base for Congress to exercise federal jurisdiction to prescribe or adjudicate
issues within "international jurisdiction" not otherwise within delegated
constitutional powers. This use should be distinguished from the function
of determining the jurisdictional threshold under a specific jurisdictional
statute such as the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act.
A statute such as the Federal Tort Claims Act or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
probably not specific enough to confer subject-matter jurisdiction over an
international human rights claim between individuals and officials or
governments. Peremptory norms of jus cogens quality by themselves do not
confer federal question or subject matter jurisdiction, not even for the most
heinous wrongs, nor do they justify an implied waiver of sovereign
immunity.102
Substantive Rules of Decision. Second, assuming a U.S. domestic court
has subject matter jurisdiction over a case or controversy (including
transitory torts), should customary international human rights law ever
determine the law governing the cause of action? With a statutory
jurisdictional basis, international choice of law principles may use, but do not
require, customary international human rights law, unless explicitly directed
by statute, as under the Torture Victim Protection Act. Forum selection of
law often might prefer foreign law or forum law for reasons of forum choice
of law policy so long as it is not incompatible with human rights law.
Although traditional customary international law has been incorporated as the
rule of decision in prize, maritime or commercial cases when no controlling
102id.
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executive or legislative policy intercedes, domestic courts resist extending
this tradition to human rights law between individuals and officials or
between individuals without a political or legislative directive. So far, jus
cogens principles have served to constrain forum policy choices of rules of
decision by increasing the strictness of the criteria for recognizing private
actions for international common law torts under the Alien Tort Statute and
other jurisdictional statutes.
Procedure of the Case. Third, should U.S. forum law alone continue to
govern procedure in human rights litigation with important effects in other
countries? 0 3 Choice of procedure policy also might apply to limitations
of actions brought by foreign plaintiffs or certification of class actions
comprised largely of claimants in other countries, when the court has
discretion. Procedure, especially in class actions with large numbers of
members in many countries, should be shaped by the forum court within its
discretionary authority to anticipate consequences that might offend
principles of fairness in international litigation or of the international system
or yield easy objections to the recognition and enforcement of its judgments
abroad that would frustrate international cooperation in achieving human
rights. 1 4
Choice of Law Governing Remedies. Fourth, what principles should
govern the choice of remedies sought or allowed, including actual and
punitive damages, equitable relief and injunctions in aid of future enforce-
ment?"°  These questions are likely to enmesh plaintiffs in international
litigation not contemplated. They need to be anticipated and faced.
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments Abroad. Fifth, what principles
of private international law or comity should govern the enforcement of a
judgment in the courts of one state for breach of customary international
10 For a general criticism of U.S. reluctance to take foreign procedure into account
sufficiently, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for
International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (Summer 1994).
'o See BRILMAYER, supra note 88, at 25, 153-55.
105 Recent decisions in Japan and on the Continent of Europe refuse to enforce foreign
judgments granting punitive damages. Decision of Aug. 28, 1993, 823 Henrei Times 126
(Japan); Decision of Bundesgerichtshof, IX Civ. Sen. June 4, 1992, 118 BGHZ 312
(Germany). See Joachim Zekoll, The Enforceability of American Money Judgments Abroad:
A Landmark Decision by the German Federal Court of Justice, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L 641 (1992). For Mareva injunctions restraining a party such as the Marcos Estate from
disposing of foreign assets (as entered in the Marcos class action human rights litigation), see
Lawrence Collins, The Territorial Reach of Mareva Injunctions, 105 L.Q. REV. 262 (1989).
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human rights law arising in another against assets in the courts of a third
state? °6 Are the interests of the international community or the forum
state harmed by recognizing and enforcing a foreign judgment for punitive
damages awarded to an international class who were inadequately represented
before the judgment forum? What is the best law for human rights victims?
For the representative of the class?
V. CONCLUSION
At each point in international human rights litigation before domestic
courts, however briefly it may be consciously considered, a forum court
should make a functional analysis with as much intuitive sense as suggested
in conflict of laws theory for each stage. It should begin its analysis with
the interests and purposes for each rule shaped or decision undertaken,
balanced among governmental and international interests in harmonious inter-
state relations, stability, predictability and effectiveness in achieving
universally recognized international human rights norms, subject to statutory
and constitutional limitations.
Consciousness in domestic court decision-making at each phase of the case
should eliminate a problem which human rights advocates sometimes place
before American courts, in effect forcing judges to base their decisions on
the choice between authorities promulgating rules. In facing a hierarchy of
loyalties between these systems of authority, U.S. federal courts do not seem
willing to subordinate their constitutional loyalty to national political
authority to that of an emerging consensus of the international community
of states, unless first given the green light by the national political branches.
The false choice between loyalty to the national political community,
allegiance to the international community of states or a new allegiance to a
cosmopolitan world community not yet here is an escape from making hard
substantive choices balancing a number of interests and values in shaping
rules of decision for each transnational human rights case. If these
alternatives of choice among authority systems are the only ones realistically
106 In the context of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, proposals for a
multilateral convention would be relevant to civil judgments in human rights cases. See
Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New
Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271 (Summer 1994);
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Thoughts About a Multinational Judgments Convention: A Reaction
to the Von Mehren Report, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (Summer 1994).
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seen by federal courts, international human rights law will continue to be but
the symptom of vast political upheaval which the federal courts will shun
entering.
